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 Fairfield notes, however, that the only Notice of Appeal in this case was filed by 
counsel for plaintiffs Hogs R Us, Scott C. McLachlan, Zane Dansie, and Keith Jonsson. 
R. 528-29. Counsel for the other plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). This appeal is subject to reassignment to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Issue 1: Did the district court properly deny Appellants' petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B), where Appellants 
petitioned the district court to compel a municipality to improve, maintain, or repair a 
certain road? 
Standard of Review: The decision to grant or deny a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is discretionary; on appeal from a grant or 
denial of extraordinary relief, the legal reasoning of the court granting or denying the writ 
is reviewed for correctness. V-l Oil Co. v. Dent, of Envtl. Quality, 939 P.2d 1192, 1195 
(Utah 1997). 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the trial court in 
its March 30, 2007 Ruling. See R. 439-441. 
Issue 2: Did the district court properly deny Appellant's petition for 
extraordinary relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B), where Appellants sought to 
compel a municipality to allow them to privately engage a contractor to improve, 
maintain, or repair the municipality's road? 
1 
Standard of Review: The decision to grant or deny a petition for 
extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is discretionary; on appeal from a grant or 
denial of extraordinary relief, the legal reasoning of the court granting or denying the writ 
is reviewed for correctness. V-l Oil Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Quality. 939 P.2d 1192, 1195 
(Utah 1997). 
Preservation of Issue Below: This issue was addressed by the trial court in 
its March 30, 2007 Ruling.2 See R. 439-441. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8. 
A municipal legislative body may lay out, establish, open, 
alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise 
improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, parks, 
airports, parking lots, or other facilities for the parking of 
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and 
may vacate the same or parts thereof, as provided in this title. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104. 
2
 Although Appellants identified this second issue as whether the District 
court erred in ruling that a municipality cannot be compelled to accept a private citizen's 
funds for the purpose of repairing a road, see Appellants Br. at 1, this issue was never 
addressed by the District court in its Ruling. See R. 437-441. Because this issue was 
never addressed by the District court and the Appellants have failed to include a statement 
of grounds seeking review of this issue as required by Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5), this issue 
should not be addressed by this Court. 
The issue the District court actually ruled on was whether it had the authority to 
compel a municipality to "allow the [Appellants] to make repairs to the road." R. 440; 
see R. 339. 
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(1) City streets comprise: 
(a) highways, roads, and streets within the corporate limits of 
the municipalities that are not designated as class A state 
roads or as class B roads; and 
(b) those highways, roads, and streets located within a 
national forest and constructed or maintained by the 
municipality under agreement with the appropriate federal 
agency. 
(2) City streets are class C roads. 
(3) Except for city streets within counties of the first and 
second class as defined in Section 17-50-501, the state and 
city have joint undivided interest in the title to all rights-of-
way for all city streets. 
(4) The municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction 
and control of the city streets within the municipality. 
(5) The department shall cooperate with the municipal 
legislative body in the construction and maintenance of the 
class C roads within each municipality. 
(6) The municipal legislative body shall expend or cause to be 
expended upon the class C roads the funds allocated to each 
municipality from the Transportation Fund under rules made 
by the department. 
(7) Any town or city in the third, fourth, or fifth class may: 
(a) contract with the county or the department for the 
construction and maintenance of class C roads within its 
corporate limits; or 
(b) transfer, with the consent of the county, its: 
(i) class C roads to the class B road system; and 
(ii) funds allocated from the Transportation Fund to the 
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municipality to the county legislative body for use upon the 
transferred class C roads. 
(8) A municipal legislative body of any city of the third, 
fourth, or fifth class may use any portion of the class C road 
funds allocated to the municipality for the construction of 
sidewalks, curbs, and gutters on class A state roads within the 
municipal limits by cooperative agreement with the 
department. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW. 
In August 2005, the Town adopted a weight limit for one of its roads, 1600 
North Street. Shortly thereafter, Appellants filed a Complaint challenging the Town's 
weight limit and seeking a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the weight 
limit ordinance. R. 10-13; R. 440. In November 2005, the district court granted the 
preliminary injunction. R. 125-126; R. 440. Almost one year later, in September 2006, 
Appellants amended their Complaint to add a claim seeking to compel the Town to make 
repairs to 1600 North. R. 233 ffif 47-48. 
In January 2007, the Town filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
arguing that the court did not have authority to compel the Town to make the requested 
repairs, R. 300-320, which the District court granted in March 2007, R. 437-441. The 
bench trial on the issue of the validity of the weight ordinance was held in April 2007, 
and the District court ruled that the ordinance was invalid and made the injunction 
permanent. R. 471-488. The final order was entered on September 24, 2007, and 
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Appellants now appeal the grant of Partial Summary Judgment in favor of the Town. R. 
528-529. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
This case arises out of the Appellants' use of a road located within the 
Town of Fairfield (the "Town") known as 1600 North Street ("the Road"). R. 441, 522 
Tf 6. The Town is located in one of the most rural, agrarian areas of Utah County, with a 
population of just 133 residents. R. 523 % 1. 
The Road 
At its western terminus, the Road intersects with State Road 73, and at its 
western terminus, and for the first mile or so of its length, the Road is known as 1540 
North. R. 522 fflf 7-8. After running nearly due east from State Road 73 for 
approximately four town blocks, the Road leaves the primary residential area of the Town 
and continues east for more than a half mile, then makes a large "S" turn and continues 
east again for approximately one and one-half miles more. From the "S" turn eastward, 
the Road is known as 1600 North. R. 522 f 9. The eastern terminus of the Road is at its 
intersection with 16000 West. R. 522 J^ 10. 16000 West is also the eastern boundary of 
the Town. 
For many years before the incorporation of the Town, Utah County 
maintained the Road. R. 522 f 11. Following the Town's incorporation, the County no 
longer provided maintenance for the Road. R. 521 f 18. 
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In 2000, while the County was responsible for the maintenance of the Road, 
the Environmental Protection Agency concluded that many of the roadways in the Town 
had arsenic and other heavy metals in them. Thus, in order to avoid toxic dust from 
billowing up during road maintenance, a chip seal was installed on the Road. R. 521 
ffif 13, 16. The process of installing a chip seal on a road includes coating the road with 
tar and then applying gravel chips over the tar. As the tar congeals, it forms a surface that 
is generally impervious to water but only between one-half and one inch thick. R. 521 
If 14. A chip seal does not provide structural integrity to the roads. R. 521 J^ 16. Once a 
road is chip sealed, it cannot be effectively graded to repair potholes or wash boarding as 
the chip seal provides a skin over the road that prevents grading. R. 521 j^ 17. 
The Appellants 
The Appellants are all businesses or individuals engaged in farming 
operations near the eastern boundary of the Town, but located either within the 
unincorporated area of Utah County or within the limits of the City of Eagle Mountain. 
R. 523 ffi[ 3, 5. With the exception of Scott McLachlan, none of the Appellants own 
property or operate their farming, ranching, or other businesses within the Town limits. 
R. 523 If 4; see R. 520 ^ 25; R. 518 Tf 31; R. 517 If 40; R. 516 143. 
For years preceding the Town's incorporation, Appellants used the Road as 
their primary access to their farm properties from State Road 73. R. 520 ^ 21. Although 
there is an Alternate Route from State Road 73 that is several miles shorter, R. 520 
6 
ffif 22-23, Appellants do not find this route to be an acceptable alternative for access to 
their farm properties. R. 520 If 24; R. 516 % 46. 
Controversy over the condition of the Road 
In 2005, the Town employed Earthtec Testing & Engineering to make 
recommendations for dealing with the impact of heavy truck traffic on the Road. Earthtec 
concluded that as it was then constructed, the Road would not support use by the reported 
25-30 heavy trucks per day. Earthtec therefore recommended that weight limitations be 
imposed until the Road could be repaved and reconstructed in the manner recommended 
in the prepared reports. R. 515 ffif 47-48; R. 514 If 58; R. 441. 
Based on this recommendation, the Town Council adopted an ordinance 
which set forth weight restrictions on the Road. R. 515 Tj 49; R. 441. Because many of 
the vehicles needing to use the Road exceeded the initial weight limit adopted by the 
Town, Earthtec recommended in August 2005 that a higher weight limit be adopted. 
R. 514 Tffl 58, 60. The Town followed'Earthtec's recommendation and modified the 
weight limit. R. 513 ^ 63. 
The Complaint 
Shortly thereafter, Appellants filed a Complaint together with a motion for 
preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Town's weight limit ordinance. 
R. 10-13; R. 440. During the hearing on the preliminary injunction, Mayor Lynn Gillies 
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testified that the Road had deteriorated as a direct result of Appellants' trucks driving 
through the "S" turn and then through town. R. 530 at 116. 
Mayor Gillies also testified that the Town's total budget for the 
maintenance of Class C roads was $38,000, and that the Town had allocated $8,000 that 
year for repairs on the Road. R. 530 at 130-131. Mayor Gillies also explained that at that 
time, however, the Town had received only a small portion of this allocation of funds 
from the State, and that without these funds, the Town could not perform all of the 
needed repairs. R. 530 at 131. 
On November 8, 2005, the District court granted the preliminary injunction 
preventing the town from enforcing the weight limit ordinance. R. 125-126; R. 440. 
Since the preliminary injunction hearing in October and November 2005, 
the Town has not performed any maintenance on the Road after it leaves the primary 
residential area of Town, and the Road has deteriorated. R. 518 f^ 33. In 2006, however, 
potholes were filled on that portion of the Road located in the primary residential area of 
the Town. R. 520 Tj 19. 
Following the preliminary injunction hearing, the Appellants obtained a bid 
and offered to pay for the filling of potholes and other repairs to the "S curve," a portion 
of the Road after it leaves the primary residential area of Town. R. 203; R. 518 |^ 35. The 
Town refused this offer, informing the Appellants in a letter that the Town was 
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determined to have repairs made to the Road in accordance with the standards 
recommended by the Earthtec engineers. R. 200; R. 518 f 35. 
The Town also informed the Appellants in a letter that any road work in the 
next few years would be focused in the residential area of Town and that it was setting 
aside a "portion of its road funds reach year in a capital account so that it will have funds 
to make major repairs and construct additional road[s] in the future." R. 195. 
The Amended Complaint 
In September 2006, Appellants submitted an Amended Complaint, adding a 
claim asking the district court for an order compelling the Town to repair the Road, or in 
the alternative, an order compelling the Town to permit Appellants to hire and pay for an 
independent contractor to make any necessary repairs to the Road. R. 231-241; R. 233 
ffif 47-48. In this Amended Complaint, Appellants alleged their dissatisfaction with the 
Alternate Route as well as general harm they would incur if the weight limit ordinance 
were enforced; they did not allege in the Amended Complaint that they had suffered or 
would suffer any injury as a result of the condition of the Road. See R. 238 ffif 18-20. 
In January 2007, the Town filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
R. 300-320, and in March 2007, the district court granted the Motion in favor of the 
Town, concluding that it did not have authority to compel the Town to either make repairs 
to the Road as Appellants requested or to allow the Appellants to hire an independent 
contractor to make repairs to the Road, R. 437-441. 
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The Appellants' Memorandum opposing the Town's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment also did not allege any specific injury to Appellants or Appellants' 
interests that has occurred or likely would occur as a result of the condition of the Road. 
See R. 343-359. The district court's March 30, 2007 Ruling on the Town's Motion also 
did not identify or address any such injury. See R. 437-441. 
In April 2007, a bench trial was held on the remaining issue of the validity 
of the Town's weight limit ordinance, R. 465-468, and the district court ultimately held 
that the Town's weight limit ordinance was invalid and made the injunction permanent, 
R. 471-488. The final order was entered on September 24, 2007. R. 511-524, 
R. 525-527. 
Appellants now appeal the grant of Partial Summary Judgment in favor of 
the Town. R. 528-529. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The case centers around the right of a municipality to exercise its discretion 
on behalf of its residents in determining if, when, and how to repair the roads within its 
municipal boundaries. Here, the Town has exercised its discretion and decided to focus 
on road repairs within the Town's residential areas first, with other, more extensive 
repairs in other areas planned for the future. 
Appellants disagree with the Town's decision, however, and now ask this 
Court to issue a writ of extraordinary relief compelling the Town to either repair the Road 
in question or to allow the Appellants to privately engage a contractor to perform the 
desired work on the Road. The purpose of mandamus is not for the courts to interfere 
with the functions or the policies of other departments of government, however, and thus 
Appellants' petition should be denied, and the district court's partial summary judgment 
ruling denying such a writ should be affirmed. 
The district court properly denied Appellants' petition for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B) for three reasons: (1) Appellants lack 
standing to bring such a petition for extraordinary relief; (2) the Appellants' petition does 
not satisfy the standard for a writ of extraordinary relief under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B); and 
(3) even were the standard of Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) satisfied, there is no evidence that the 
Town has sufficient funds under its control with which to make the repairs. 
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First, the Appellants lack standing to bring a petition for extraordinary relief 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. It is the plaintiffs burden to establish standing, and 
Appellants fail to satisfy that standard because they do not show that they suffered any 
"particularized injury" which directly resulted from the condition of the Road. Thus, 
Appellants do not have a personal stake in the outcome of the dispute, and there are 
others, including actual Town residents, who have a greater interest in the outcome of the 
case. Although the district court did not address the issue of standing in the partial 
summary judgment proceedings, the issue may be raised at any time. 
Second, the district court properly denied Appellants' petition for 
extraordinary relief because it does not satisfy the standard of Rule 65B(d)(2)(B). A 
petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B(d) is essentially a petition for a writ 
of mandamus, and to obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show both a clear legal 
right to the performance of the act demanded and a clear legal duty of the defendant to 
perform as demanded. Appellants cannot make this showing, however, because under 
both Utah statutory and common law, there is no mandatory duty for a municipality to 
improve, maintain, or repair its roads. 
Finally, even if such a duty were found to exist, Appellants' petition should 
still be denied because there is no evidence that the Town has sufficient funds under its 
control with which to make the repairs. Courts may refuse to grant a writ to coerce a 
municipality to make repairs to its roads when there is no showing that the municipality 
12 
has fonds on hand and available with which to make the repairs. The Appellants fail to 
make that showing, and in fact, the Record shows that the Town has limited 
transportation fiinds available. 
The district court's Ruling denying Appellants' petition for extraordinary 
relief under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) should be affirmed. 
13 
ARGUMENT 
L APPELLANTS LACK STANDING TO BRING A PETITION FOR 
EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF PURSUANT TO UTAH RULE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 65B 
Appellants lack standing to bring a petition for extraordinary relief pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. "Standing is a jurisdictional requirement that must be satisfied 
before a court may entertain a controversy between two parties," Jones v. Barlow, 2007 
UT 20, f 12, 154 P.3d 808 (quotation omitted), and a petitioner for extraordinary relief 
must have standing, just as any other litigant must have. Terraocor v. Utah Bd. of State 
Lands & Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986). Although the issue of standing was not 
addressed by the district court during the partial summary judgment proceedings, this 
Court may nonetheless address the issue. See id. 
There are three general standards for determining whether a plaintiff has 
standing, and under the first and most important standard, the plaintiff must show that he 
has suffered a "particularized injury," or in other words, a "distinct and palpable injury 
that gives him a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute." Terracor, 716 P.2d 
at 799-800. To satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff must not only claim that it has been 
or will be adversely affected by the challenged actions, but must also "allege a causal 
relationship between the injury to the party, the challenged actions, and the relief 
requested." Utah Ch. of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd.. 2006 UT 73, ^  5, 148 
P.3d975. 
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Here, Appellants do not have standing because they have not established, or 
even alleged, any facts showing that they suffered a particularized injury which directly 
resulted from the condition of the Road. Neither the Amended Complaint nor Appellants' 
Memorandum in Opposition to the Town's Partial Summary Judgment Motion included 
even a general allegation of such facts, let alone any identification of a specific injury. It 
is the plaintiffs burden to establish standing, D.A.R. v. State, 2006 UT App. 114, ^  5, 
133 P.3d 445, and by failing to show or even allege a particularized injury caused by the 
challenged action, Appellants have failed to meet this burden.3 
3
 Appellants also do not have standing under either of the other two 
standards. If a plaintiff does not have standing under the first standard, he may still have 
standing "if no one else has a greater interest in the outcome of the case." Terracor, 716 
P.2d at 799. This second standard is not satisfied here, however, because the District 
court found that aside from Scott McLachlan, Appellants do not even own property or 
operate their farming, ranching, or other businesses within the Town limits. There are 
others who could raise the same challenges raised by Appellants, and who would have a 
greater, more direct interest in doing so. Specifically, parties who are actually Town 
residents would have a much greater interest than the Appellants in determining whether 
and how Town funds and resources should be allocated toward the maintenance and 
repair of any of the Town's roads. 
Finally, even if standing is not found to exist under the first two standards, there is 
a limited third standard that may nonetheless allow a plaintiff to have standing if the 
"issues are unique and of such great public importance that they ought to be decided in 
furtherance of the public interest." Id at 799-800. However, where, as here, there are 
other obvious potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest in the issues in the case, the 
Utah Supreme Court has declined to address this third standard. See id. at 800 ("Since 
there are 'other potential plaintiffs with a more direct interest' in the issues in this case, 
we decline to reach this third test, whether the public importance of the issues raised is so 
great that they ought to be litigated in any event."). 
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Important policy considerations also contribute to the conclusion that the 
Appellants lack standing. "Unlike federal law where standing doctrine is related to the 
'case or controversy' language of Article III of the United States Constitution, [Utah's] 
standing law arises from the general precepts of the doctrine of separation of powers 
found in Article V of the Utah Constitution." Terracor, 716 P.2d at 798. Thus, "[u]nder 
Utah law, the doctrine of standing operates as gatekeeper to the courthouse, allowing in 
only those cases that are fit for judicial resolution. Important jurisprudential 
considerations dictate that courts confine themselves to resolution of those disputes most 
effectively resolved through the judicial process . . . . " Id. at 798-799. 
The purpose of using the standing doctrine as a "gatekeeper to the 
courthouse" is to limit judicial power "so that there will not 'be a significant inroad on the 
representative form of government, cast[ing] the courts in the role of supervising the 
coordinate branches of government. . . [and converting] the judiciary into an open forum 
for the resolution of political and ideological disputes about the performance of 
government.'" Id at 799 (quotation omitted). For these reasons, this Court "will not 
lightly dispense with the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake in the outcome 
of a specific dispute." Id. 
As will be discussed in greater depth below, the dispute here over if, when, 
and how the Town should maintain and repair the Road is a political dispute based on a 
discretionary legislative decision by the Town's legislative body. See Town of Perry v. 
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Thomas. 22 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1933) (stating that under Utah's statutes, the public 
necessity or expediency of opening a public street "is a question for determination by the 
governing board of the municipality" and that the "powers thus delegated to municipal 
boards" is a "political question"). Therefore, a court is not the best and most appropriate 
forum in which to resolve this issue, and this Court should be even more cautious 
regarding standing to avoid supervising or interfering with a coordinate branch of 
government. 
Because Appellants lack standing to bring a petition for extraordinary relief 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B, the district court's March 30, 2007 Ruling should be 
upheld. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' 
PETITION BECAUSE IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE STANDARD 
FOR A WRIT OF EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF UNDER UTAH 
RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 65B(d)(2)(B) 
Even if this Court determines that Appellants have standing to bring this 
petition, the district court's March 30, 2007 Ruling should still be upheld because 
Appellants' petition does not satisfy the standard for a writ of extraordinary relief under 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B. Appellants seek a writ of extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 
65B(d)(2)(B), see Appellants Br. at 14-15, which states that appropriate relief may be 
granted "where an inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has failed 
to perform an act required by law as a duty of office, trust or station." (emphasis added). 
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With the promulgation of Rule 65B, the "common law forms and 
procedures for extraordinary writs were abolished in keeping with modern concepts of 
pleading and practice, but the remedies continue to be available." Renn v. Utah State Bd. 
of Pardons. 904 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah 1995). Today, extraordinary writs under Rule 65B 
are available only when there is "no plain, speedy and adequate remedy" at law. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 65B(a). 
Because Rule 65B provides for several different types of extraordinary 
relief, before granting a petition for extraordinary relief, "a court must look to the nature 
of the relief sought, the circumstances alleged in the petition, and the purpose of the type 
of writ sought." Renn, 904 P.2d at 683. If the nature of the relief sought, the alleged 
circumstances, or the purpose of the type of writ sought do not meet the conditions under 
Rule 65B for obtaining any of the types of extraordinary relief available, then such relief 
cannot be granted. Id 
In this case, the nature of the relief sought, the alleged circumstances, and 
the purposes of the type of writ sought do not meet the conditions of Rule 65B, and thus, 
the district court correctly concluded that the requested relief could not be granted. First, 
the nature of the relief Appellants seek is mandamus, because a petition for relief 
pursuant to Rule 65B(d) is essentially a petition for a writ of mandamus. See State v. 
Barrett, 2005 UT 88, If 7 n.5, H 11, 127 P.3d 682 (stating that relief formerly granted 
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under writs of mandamus is generally available through rule 65B(d)); see also Cope v. 
Toronto. 332 P.2d 977, 978 (Utah 1958). 
Second, the purpose of a writ of mandamus is to compel action when there 
is both a clear legal right to relief and a clear duty to act, and here there is neither. In 
order to obtain a writ of mandamus, a petitioner must show two things: (1) "a clear legal 
right to the performance of the act demanded," and (2) "a plain duty of the officer, 
board, or other tribunal to perform as demanded." Garcia v. Jones. 510 P.2d 1099, 1100 
(Utah 1973) (quotation omitted) (emphasis added) ("To be entitled to the issuance of the 
writ, petitioner had to prove that the [defendant] had a clear statutory duty to perform 
certain acts and refused to do so."); see Tuttle v. Bd. of Educ. of Salt Lake City, 294 P. 
294, 300 (Utah 1930) (same); Haslam v. Morrison. 190 P.2d 520, 524 (Utah 1948) 
(same). If there is doubt as to either of these two things, the writ will be denied. Haslam, 
190 P.2d at 524: see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Scholes, 601 F.2d 1151, 1154 
(10th Cir. 1979) ("Mandamus is an extraordinary writ, and the requirements for its 
issuance are strict."). 
As a result of these principles, relief under Rule 65B(d)(2)(B) is "limited," 
and "[c]ourts proceed with extreme caution in granting writs of mandamus." Rice v. Utah 
Securities Div., 2004 UT App. 215, K 7, 95 P.3d 1169. At all times, "the petitioning party 
has the burden of showing that its right to issuance of the writ is 'clear and indisputable." 
Id. (quotation omitted). 
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Moreover, even if a petitioner satisfies its burden to establish both a clear 
legal right and a clear legal duty, the granting of the writ of mandamus is always a matter 
of discretion with the court and never a matter of right. Renn, 904 P.2d at 683; see V-l 
Oil Co. v. Dept. of Envtl. Oualitv. 939 P.2d 1192, 1195 (Utah 1997) ("A court's decision 
to grant or deny a petition for extraordinary relief in the nature of mandamus is 
discretionary with the court to which the petition is brought, and it is discretionary in the 
sense that it is never a matter of right on behalf of the applicant."). A court possesses 
"total discretion in [its] decision to grant or deny the petition for extraordinary relief." 
Newman v. Behrens, 1999 UT App. 90, ^ ll,980P.2d 1191. 
Here, Appellants are not entitled to extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 
65B(d)(2)(B) because they have not met their burden of establishing a right to such a writ 
that is "clear and indisputable." Notably, Appellants have failed to satisfy even the 
threshold standard of Rule 65B because they have not alleged that they have no other 
plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. More important, however, as will be discussed 
in greater detail below, they have failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 65B because 
they do not show that they have a clear legal right to a compel the Town to act or that the 
Town has a clear legal duty to improve, maintain, or repair this Road. Therefore, the 
district court properly exercised its discretion and denied Appellants' petition for 
extraordinary relief. 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS5 
PETITION BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT GRANT COURTS 
THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL MUNICIPALITIES TO 
IMPROVE, MAINTAIN, OR REPAIR ROADS 
The district court properly denied Appellants' petition for extraordinary 
relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(B) because Utah law does not grant courts 
the authority to compel a municipality to maintain or repair its road. In particular, neither 
Utah's statutes nor Utah's tort common law create a mandatory duty by which the Town 
could be compelled to maintain or repair any of its roads, let alone the specific Road at 
issue in this litigation. Accordingly, no clear duty exists upon which a writ for 
extraordinary relief could be based, and the district court's Ruling should be upheld. 
A. Utah Statutes Do Not Create A Mandatory Duty By Which A 
Municipality Can Be Compelled To Improve, Maintain, Or Repair 
Its Roads 
The district court properly denied Appellants' petition pursuant to Rule 
65B(d)(2)(B) because Utah statutes do not create a mandatory duty by which a 
municipality can be compelled to improve, maintain, or repair its roads. Without such a 
statutory mandate, the Appellants cannot show either a clear legal right to compel such 
performance or a plain duty on the part of the Town to so perform. 
As noted above, a mandamus petitioner must show that the municipality had 
a plain duty to act as demanded. As a result, "[mjandamus will lie to compel a 
municipality or its officers to repair a public way when the duty to do so is ministerial and 
clearly imposed by law." 17 McQuillan Mun. Corp. § 51:45 (3d ed.). "[W]here there is 
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no duty imposed on the public body or officials to make the particular repair or 
improvement, or where the matter rests in their judgment and discretion," the writ will be 
denied. 52 Am. Jur. 2d Mandamus § 217. 
In Utah, there is no statutory duty for a municipality to improve, maintain, 
or repair its roads; rather, the matter of maintaining municipal roads rests entirely within 
the judgment and discretion of the municipality. Under Utah's Municipal Code, 
municipalities have been given the responsibility to make decisions regarding all road 
improvements, and this responsibility is discretionary: 
A municipal legislative body may lay out, establish, open, 
alter, widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave, or otherwise 
improve streets, alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports, parking lots, or other facilities for the parking 
vehicles off streets, public grounds, and pedestrian malls and 
may vacate the same or parts thereof, as provided in this title. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-8 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(4) 
("The municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction and control of the city 
streets within the municipality.") (emphasis added).4 
When interpreting statutes, courts look first to the plain language of the 
statute; in doing so, courts "presume that the legislature used each word advisedly" and 
4
 "City streets" as that term is used in § 72-3-104(4) comprise "highways, 
roads, and streets within the corporate limits of the municipalities that are not designated 
as class A state roads or as class B roads." Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(l)(a). "City 
streets" are class C roads. Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(2). 
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"give effect to each term according to its ordinary meaning." State v. Barrett. 2005 UT 
88,129, 127 P.3d 682. In § 10-8-8, the legislature used the term "may" rather than 
"shall," and thus the ordinary meaning of "may" dictates that the duty identified in that 
statute is discretionary and not mandatory. 
Based on this plain language in § 10-8-8, it is disingenuous for Appellants 
to argue as they do that "Utah statues which set forth a municipality's duty to maintain its 
streets contain no discretionary language" and that "nothing in the Code provides that a 
municipality 'may' be responsible for the . . . maintenance of those streets." Appellants 
Br. at 19 (emphasis in original). Appellants make no attempt to reconcile the 
discretionary language in § 10-8-8 with their assertion of a mandatory duty created under 
Utah law, and in fact, in their Brief they ignore § 10-8-8 entirely. 
As a result of this plain discretionary language contained in § 10-8-8, 
decisions regarding all of the matters set out in that statute - including road improvements 
- are legislative decisions resting within the discretion of the municipal legislative bodies. 
See Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corp., 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 1993) (holding that 
decisions regarding improvements such as sidewalks, which are covered by § 10-8-8, are 
municipal legislative decisions); Town of Perry v. Thomas, 22 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1933) 
(relied on in Braithwaite; holding that a town council's decision to open a public street 
was a political question not subject to review by the courts and that the same principle 
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applies to the construction of sidewalks because they are both covered by the same 
statute). 
Despite the clear applicability of § 10-8-8 to this appeal, Appellants ignore 
Utah's Municipal Code and instead cite to several provisions of Utah's Transportation 
Code to support their claim of a statutory duty. Nothing in the Transportation Code 
imposes such a duty, however. The first statute the Appellants point to is Utah Code Ann. 
§ 72-3-104, see Appellants Br. at 10, which as quoted above, supports the discretionary 
language of § 10-8-8 and explicitly states that the legislative body of a municipality has 
the "sole jurisdiction" to decide how to improve, maintain, or repair the municipality's 
roads. Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(4). 
Another subsection of this statute relied on by Appellants simply states that 
the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT") "shall cooperate with the municipal 
legislative body in the construction and maintenance of the class C roads within each 
municipality." Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(5). This statute gives direction to UDOT, but 
gives no direction to the municipalities involved, and the only direction to UDOT is to 
cooperate with the municipal legislative body. This statutory language makes it clear that 
only the municipal governing body is to make decisions regarding the improvement, 
maintenance, and repair of its roads, and even UDOT is not to direct how such 
improvements, maintenance, or repairs are to be made. If UDOT is not to direct how 
municipal roads are improved, maintained, or repaired, parties who use the roads and the 
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courts should also not be able to direct how the roads are improved, maintained, or 
repaired. Under Utah law, those decisions are clearly left to the sole discretion of the 
municipal legislative bodies. 
Appellants also rely on § 72-6-108, which outlines conditions with which a 
municipality must comply prior to the "construction" of any "improvement project." 
Contrary to Appellants' assertion, this statute does not require the municipality to engage 
in any particular improvement project; rather, it simply outlines the procedures a 
municipality must follow once it has decided, in its own discretion, to commence such a 
project. This statute states, 
[T]he municipal executive for class C roads shall cause plans, 
specifications, and estimates to be made prior to the 
construction of any improvement project, as defined in 
Section 72-6-109, on a class B or C road if the estimated cost 
for any one project exceeds the bid limit as defined in Section 
72-6-109 for labor, equipment, and materials. 
Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-108(a) (emphasis added).5 
The Appellants' other attempt to find a statutory duty for the Town to 
improve, maintain, or repair its roads is Utah's Governmental Immunity Act. See 
5
 The Town notes that the term "construction of an improvement project" in § 
72-6-108 may not even include road maintenance or repair. As the term is defined in § 
72-6-109, "construction" specifically excludes "maintenance," which in turn is defined as 
"the keeping of a road facility in a safe and usable condition." Utah Code Ann. §§ 72-6-
109(l)(c)(ii), (l)(e). The scope of this limitation on the definition of "construction" is 
ultimately unclear, however, because "improvement project" is defined this same section 
as including both "construction and maintenance." Utah Code Ann. § 72-6-109(l)(d). 
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Appellants Br. at 13-14. All that Act does is waive governmental immunity for suits 
claiming injuries caused by defective, unsafe, or dangerous conditions on the roads and 
other facilities or improvements, however. The Act simply allows certain tort claims to 
be brought against a municipality, but it does not impose any particular duty on a 
municipality, nor does it direct how municipalities must improve, maintain, or repair their 
roads. 
In the end, as Appellants acknowledge, there is not a single case where a 
Utah court compelled a municipality to improve, maintain, or repair its roads. See 
Appellants Br. at 17 (acknowledging that no Utah court has addressed whether a court 
may, through mandamus, compel a municipality to improve, maintain, or repair its roads). 
The reason there are no such cases is because those decisions are left to the sole 
discretion of municipal legislative bodies. Courts do not have the authority to supervise 
or interfere with a municipal council's discretionary decisions on those matters.6 
6
 Appellants do cite cases from other jurisdictions in which mandamus was 
used to compel a municipality to improve, maintain, or repair its roads. See Appellants 
Br. at 18-19. Significantly, each of these cases in distinguishable (and thus not applicable 
here) because in each case, a state statute created a mandatory duty on which the court 
relied in granting the writ of mandamus. 
For example, the state statute at issue in Willoughby v. Whetstone Township Bd.. 
581 N.W.2d 165 (S.D. 1988), reads, "It shall be the duty of the board of township 
supervisors to arrange for the construction, repair, and maintenance of all secondary roads 
within the township." LI at 168 (italics in original). Thus, the court in that case 
concluded, "By statute, the board of supervisors must repair and maintain all township 
roads or secondary highways." Id. (emphasis added). 
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Because a municipality has no clear mandatory duty under Utah's statutes to 
improve, maintain, or repair its roads, the district court properly denied the Appellants' 
petition for extraordinary relief. 
B. Utah Common Law Does Not Create A Mandatory Duty By Which 
Municipalities Can Be Compelled To Improve, Maintain, Or 
Repair Roads 
Just as Utah's statutes do not create a mandatory duty by which 
municipalities can be compelled to improve, maintain, or repair roads, Utah's tort 
common law also does not create any duty by which the Town could be compelled to 
improve, maintain, or repair its roads. 
Appellants correctly note that under Utah tort law, municipalities have a 
duty to exercise "ordinary care to keep streets which it has opened for travel and which it 
Similarly, in Lank v. Hughes, 167 A.2d 268 (Pa. 1961), the state statute at issue 
provides that "[t]he township supervisors, or the supervisors acting as superintendants or 
roadmasters, shall (a) have the general care and superintendance of the improvement of 
the roads . . . in the township . . . (b) cause such roads . . . to be kept in repair and 
reasonably free from all obstructions." Id. at 286 (emphasis added). Thus, the court 
concluded that the "duty to repair and maintain public roads may be enforced through 
mandamus. Id. 
In Ross v. Fox, 2003 Ohio 3513 (Ohio App. 2003) (unreported), the state statute at 
issue states that the boards of township trustees shall have control of the township roads 
in their townships and shall keep them in good repair. Id. at f^ 7. Thus, the court in that 
case concluded that "[t]hese provisions are mandatory and can be enforced through a writ 
of mandamus." 14; see also Pund v. Village of Walton Hills. 2002 Ohio 981 ffil 2-3 
(Ohio App. 2002) (unreported) (stating that under the state statute at issue, township 
trustees are charged with the duties to repair and drag township roads and concluding as a 
result that these provisions are mandatory and may be compelled by a writ of mandamus). 
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has invited the public to use in a reasonable safe condition for travel." Braithwaite v. 
West Vallev City Corp.. 860 P.2d 336, 338 (Utah 1993); see Appellant's Br. at 12-13 
(citing Braithwaite as Lee v. West Vallev CityV 
The Town acknowledges that Utah courts have allowed negligence suits 
against municipalities for unsafe road conditions and that municipalities have a duty of 
care under that common law principle to maintain their roads in a safe condition. This 
principle does not compel the relief the Appellants seek, however, because an identifiable 
duty under tort law for negligence purposes does not automatically or even logically 
create a mandatory duty which can be enforced through mandamus. If it did, the result 
could be chaos, with any private citizen suddenly free to petition the court for a writ 
compelling a municipality to affirmatively act as that citizen desires, based on any one of 
the innumerable "duties" which can form the basis of a negligence claim. See Rvberg v. 
Lundstrom, 261 P. 453, 455 (Utah 1927) (stating that where the issue of a writ of 
mandamus would "create disorder or confusion," it should be denied, "even where the 
petitioner has a clear legal right for which mandamus would be an appropriate remedy) 
(quotation omitted) (emphasis added)). 
In sum, the fact that a municipality may be held liable under tort law for 
injuries or damages resulting from dangerous or unsafe roads does not mean that a court 
can compel a municipality to spend town funds to make any specific road improvements, 
nor does it give the courts the prerogative to direct what repairs a municipality must 
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undertake to make a road safe. Appellants' reliance on Utah's Governmental Immunity 
Act is similarly misplaced, see Appellants Br. at 13-14, because the waiver of 
governmental immunity for "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, 
road, street, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or other structure 
located on them," Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-301(3), simply corresponds with this 
common law tort liability but also does nothing to create a mandatory duty which could 
be enforced through mandamus. Thus, under Utah common law there is no mandatory 
duty for a municipality to improve, maintain, or repair its roads, and the district court 
properly denied Appellants' petition for extraordinary relief. 
C. Even If A Mandatory Duty Could Be Found Under Utah Law, A 
Municipality Will Not Be Compelled To Improve, Maintain, Or 
Repair Roads When It Lacks The Funds To Do So 
Even if a clear legal duty could be found to exist under Utah law, 
Appellants' petition should still be denied because there is no evidence that the Town has 
sufficient funds on hand to make the requested repairs. 
"[T]he doing of an official act will not ordinarily be compelled by 
mandamus where the required funds are not available," and "the court may refuse the writ 
to coerce the making of repairs of the kind under consideration where there is no showing 
that there are funds on hand and available with which to make the repairs." 52 Am. Jur. 
2d Mandamus § 217; see 17 McQuillan Mun. Corp. § 51:45 (3d ed.) ("Mandamus will lie 
to compel a municipality or its officers to repair a public way when the duty to do so is 
29 
ministerial and clearly imposed by law, provided they have funds on hand or under 
their control for such a purpose."). 
Here, the Town has limited transportation funds available for the 
maintenance of its roads, and thus the Town has made the judgment to use the resources it 
has to repair and maintain roads other than the specific Road Appellants desire to see 
repaired. Appellants have offered no evidence that the Town has sufficient funds to both 
pursue its own road maintenance plans and perform the repairs the Appellants request. 
Thus, a writ of mandamus is inappropriate, and the District court properly denied the 
Appellants' petition for extraordinary relief 
Because Appellants cannot show that the Town has a clear duty to perform 
under Utah law or that the Town has sufficient funds under its control to repair the Road, 
the district court properly concluded that it could not compel the Town to improve, 
maintain, or repair the Road. The district court properly denied the Appellants' petition 
for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65(B)(d)(2)(B). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED APPELLANTS' 
PETITION BECAUSE UTAH LAW DOES NOT GRANT COURTS 
THE AUTHORITY TO COMPEL MUNICIPALITIES TO ALLOW A 
THIRD PARTY TO IMPROVE, MAINTAIN, OR REPAIR ROADS 
The district court properly denied Appellants' petition because Utah law 
does not grant courts the authority to compel a municipality to allow a third party to 
improve, maintain, or repair the municipality's roads. Where, as here, there is no basis 
for granting a writ of mandamus compelling a municipality itself to improve, maintain, or 
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repair its roads, there is even less justification to compel a municipality to allow a third 
party to independently improve, maintain, or repair the municipality's roads. 
Appellants bear the burden of showing that their right to issuance of the 
writ is "clear and indisputable," State Farm, 601 F.2d at 1154, and yet they cite to no 
authority supporting their assertion that a municipality could or should be so compelled. 
See Appellants Br. at 10-24. In fact, compelling a municipality to allow a third party to 
improve, maintain, or repair the municipality's roads would directly conflict with the 
clear statutory direction that the "municipal governing body exercises sole jurisdiction 
and control of the city streets within the municipality." Utah Code Ann. § 72-3-104(4). 
Furthermore, compelling a municipality in this way would be wholly 
inappropriate because it would place municipalities in an impossible situation, where the 
municipality could be liable under tort law for injuries or damages as a result of unsafe 
roads but could also lose the ability to determine for itself how to make these roads safe 
by choosing when and how to perform road maintenance and repair. Because Utah's 
common law and Governmental Immunity Act allow a municipality to be liable under tort 
law for the condition of its roads, it is even more important that the municipality be given 
complete discretion to determine what the condition of its roads should be. Compelling a 
municipality to allow others to make repairs (or even to donate private funds as a way of 
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dictating what those repairs should be)7 would place municipalities in the legally 
indefensible position of being potentially liable under tort law for actions that they did not 
perform nor control. 
Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that it could not compel 
the Town to allow a third party to improve, maintain, or repair the Road. The district 
court properly denied the Appellants' petition for extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 
65(B)(d)(2)(B). 
V. SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' PETITION 
FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF PURSUANT TO RULE 
65B(d)(2)(B) 
Just as important as the legal principles discussed above, substantial policy 
considerations support the district court's conclusion that it lacked authority to compel the 
municipality either to improve, maintain, or repair the Road itself, or to allow a third party 
to independently improve, maintain, or repair the Road. 
A writ of mandamus is simply not appropriate under the circumstances of 
this case because the power to improve and repair public streets is in its nature legislative. 
See R. 439 (the district court's Mar. 30, 2007 Ruling on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
7
 Compelling a municipality to accept private funds intended for the repair of 
a specific road is even more problematic than compelling a municipality to perform the 
repairs itself. In addition to taking away the municipality's discretion to decide how to 
best maintain its roads, this would improperly and unfairly allow more affluent 
neighborhoods to essentially "buy" better public services than other neighborhoods might 
receive. 
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Summary Judgment); 13 McQuillan Mun. Corp. § 37.27 (3d ed.); see also TownofPerrv 
v. Thomas. 22 P.2d 343, 345 (Utah 1933) (stating that the "necessity, expediency, or 
propriety of opening a public street or way is a political question"). 
Accordingly, "[t]he court cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the 
tribunal to which the discretion was committed by law." Rose v. Plymouth Town, 173 
P.2d 285, 286 (Utah 1946) (affirming trial court's refusal to compel town to extend water 
mains to the plaintiffs residence and supply him with water). The purpose of mandamus 
"is not for the courts to intrude into or interfere with the functions or the policies of other 
departments of government." Wright Devel. v. City of Wellsville. 608 P.2d 232, 233 
(Utah 1980). Thus, where the action sought is a matter of discretion, a plaintiff may 
request the trial court to direct the exercise of discretionary action, but "the writ is not 
available to 'direct the exercise of judgement or discretion in a particular way"' Rice v. 
Utah Securities Div., 2004 UT App. 215, f 7, 95 P.3d 1169 (emphasis in original); see 
Wright, 608 P.2d at 233 (stating that while the court may require the public body or 
public official to act, it "will not substitute its judgment for that of the public body, by 
telling it how to decide"): see generally Mantua Town v. Carr. 584P.2d912, 913-914 
(Utah 1978) (affirming that it is neither "the prerogative nor the responsibility of the 
courts to supervise nor interfere with" the management and control of the town water 
works). 
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Here, the Town's legislative body did not fail to act or exercise its 
discretion. Instead, it exercised its discretion by considering the issue and then 
determining which of its roads to repair and how to repair them, and this Court should not 
substitute its own judgment for that of the Town's by now compelling the Town to repair 
a certain road in a certain way. Because the Town is small and has limited transportation 
funds available, the Town told the Appellants that it had decided to focus on road repair 
in the Town's residential areas first, and that other, more extensive repairs on other roads 
were planned for the future. 
As a part of this plan, the Town chose to use some of its resources in 2006 
to perform repairs to the Road within the primary residential part of the Town rather than 
further out near the "S" curve, and the repair on this portion of the Road has benefitted 
the Town's residents. This was a valid legislative decision for the Town to make, and this 
Court should not intrude on that decision. This is especially true in light of the fact that 
the Town believes that the Appellants caused, or at least substantially contributed to, the 
deterioration of the Road.8 In fact, to issue a writ of mandamus in this case would be to 
trod on the rights of the Town's residents who have duly elected their Town officials to 
make careful decisions about how to allocate the Town's relatively scarce resources, and 
who have benefitted from the maintenance the Town has chosen to perform. 
8
 See generally Utah Code Ann. § 72-7-301(1) (stating that a person can be 
liable for willful or negligent damage to a highway). 
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The district court properly denied the Appellants' petition for a writ of 
extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B(d)(2)(B). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's 
Ruling of March 30, 2007, denying Appellants' petition for extraordinary relief under 
Rule 65B(d)(2)(B). 
DATED this jj_ day of February, 2008 
WOOD CRAPO LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
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